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THE RISE OF MODERN JUDICIAL REVIEW: FROM CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION TO JUDGE-MADE LAW. By Christopher Wolfe. 
New York: Basic Books, Inc. 1986. Pp. x, 392. $24.95. 
Has the contemporary Supreme Court exceeded its constitutional 
powers? Are recent decisions made in the guise of judicial review ac-
tually manifestations of an activist jurisprudence? Has the Court en-
croached upon legislative territory? 
Christopher Wolfe1 answers these questions affirmatively in The 
Rise of Modern Judicial Review. He traces the Court's changing juris-
prudential approach from the early and limited exercise of judicial re-
view Chief Justice John Marshall enunciated in Marbury v. Madison 2 
to the far-reaching holdings of the Warren and Burger courts. Wolfe's 
thesis is that the once "distinctively judicial power" of the early Court 
"has become merely another variant of legislative power" (p. 3). He 
contends that successive Courts have seen fewer and fewer definite 
constraints in the Constitution's language and context; the Justices in-
stead have seen the document more as a collection of " 'presumptions' 
based on supposedly vague general principles" (p. 327). This modem 
approach requires numerous "balancing tests" to determine whether 
the "countervailing principles at stake" in any individual case may 
rebut these presumptions (p. 327). 
The Rise of Modern Judicial Review begins by considering the lim-
ited role of judicial review immediately after the adoption of the Con-
1. Associate Professor of Political Science at Marquette University. 
2. S U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
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stitution. Wolfe argues that at that time the rules for interpretation 
were "so generally agreed upon that they were ... taken for granted" 
(p. 17). Wolfe reads Sir William Blackstone and The Federalist to 
state that the interpretive model accepted at the time of the early con-
stitutional debates placed primary emphasis upon the words of the 
document. 3 Ambiguity was resolved through consideration of the lan-
guage in the context of "the whole document and its parts."4 
The incorporation of the concept of "moderate" judicial review 
into this traditional, literal, and contextual model of interpretation 
was accomplished, according to Wolfe, through adherence to three 
critical concepts: the "inherent limits of judicial power, legislative def-
erence, and the political questions doctrine" (p. 101). The first con-
cept, "inherent limits," restrained judges' individual wills, favoring 
instead reliance upon their judgment as to a law's constitutionality. 
Their perceptions of wisdom and social desirability were to be placed 
aside. The second critical concept, legislative deference, proscribed ju-
dicial review in ambiguous cases. Deferential judges recognized that 
"a decent respect [is] due to the wisdom, the integrity, and the patriot-
ism of the legislative body ... to presume in favor of [a law's] validity, 
until its violation of the constitution is proved beyond reasonable 
doubt."5 Finally, the political questions doctrine eschewed any appli-
cation ofjudical review to "discretionary acts of other branches," such 
as the presidential appointment and foreign affairs powers (p. 106). 
Wolfe integrates these three guiding principles of constitutional inter-
pretation into a stringent limitation on judicial review. 
John Marshall, Wolfe argues, based his theory of judicial review 
upon these three concepts. Marshall's process of interpretation relied 
upon his "effecting not his own will but the will of the law: the Consti-
tution" (p. 41); he perceived the Constitution as an agglomeration of 
''fundamental principles that look to the distant future and not 
merely the moment" (p. 45; emphasis in original). Wolfe writes that 
for Marshall, constitutional analysis took on the foundational quality 
reflected in his famous admonition that "we must never forget, that it 
is a constitution we are expounding."6 For Marshall and his immedi-
ate successors, judicial review meant solely "the power to strike down 
laws that clearly violate the Constitution"7 - laws whose effects indu-
3. See pp. 20-24. This interpretive model is particularly evident in THE FEDERALIST Nos. 33 
and 83 (A. Hamilton). 
4. P. 24. The debates raged within a common view of interpretation. For example, in the 
debate over the National Bank, Madison and Hamilton arrived at opposite conclusions while 
agreeing on the "rules of interpretation." P. 25. 
5. Pp. 104-05 (quoting Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 270 (1827)). 
6. P. 45 (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) (emphasis in 
original)). 
7. P. 77 (emphasis added). Wolfe develops this language from THE FEDERALIST Nos. 78 
and 81 (A. Hamilton). 
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bitably are to crack the foundation's cement. In brief, Wolfe argues 
that Marshallianjudicial review does not give Justices carte blanche to 
choose between various reasonable interpretations. 
This conception of judicial review, says Wolfe, did not last; the 
"balance of our 'balanced republic' " was not maintained. 8 Instead 
the federal judiciary began its slow but unquestionable evolution to-
ward the present day's nearly unrestrained judicial activism. 
Wolfe characterizes this "transitional era" as the period during 
which the Court's jurisprudence foreshadowed the emergence of the 
modem Court while retaining a theoretical commitment to Marshal-
lian traditional values. This period ran from the final quarter of the 
nineteenth century through the demise of economic substantive due 
process. Wolfe argues that the Roosevelt court-packing plan cat-
apulted the Court into its fully modem form. 
Of pivotal importance in the transitional process, Wolfe argues, 
was the passage of the fourteenth amendment. Its passage increased 
federal power over the states, and its three key provisions - privileges 
and immunities, due process, and equal protection - became the vehi-
cles for a broad expansion of judicial power during the subsequent 
century (pp. 120, 123). To fortify his view that the fourteenth amend-
ment induced voluminous overexpansion of the judicial power, Wolfe 
argues that the ambiguous language and history of the amendment 
defy resolution. The resulting constitutional uncertainty compels 
Wolfe to advocate a drastically limited principle of judicial review: 
Since the traditional model, he writes, permits judicial review only in 
cases presenting clear conflicts between Constitution and statute, am-
biglious (and socially controversial) cases ought to remain outside of 
the judiciary's province. Wolfe's comparison of this ideal and reality 
reveals a "historic irony" of fourteenth amendment jurisprudence (p. 
143): the very ambiguities that most certainly ought to have con-
strained judicial activism have instead been seized upon as opportuni-
ties for judges "to 'interpret' the Constitution as they prefer and then 
to strike down laws that are incompatible with the preferred 
'interpretations' ".9 
Building upon this analysis, Wolfe demonstrates the transitional 
era's progression - perhaps Wolfe would prefer "regression" - into 
the modem mode of constitutional inquiry. He cites the economic 
substantive due process decisions as the first great expressions of the 
8. P. 116 (quoting J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES 419 (1873)). 
9. P. 143. Wolfe's treatment of the fourteenth amendment reflects the thoroughness of his 
analysis, but it also forces him to distinguish any interpretation that does not fit the "transition" 
motif. Other commentators also have found ambiguity in the fourteenth amendment's history. 
A convincing argument may be made in favor of a broad reading of the amendment. See, e.g., M. 
CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF 
RIGHTS 12-13, 91 (1986), reviewed by Book Notice, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1188 (1987). 
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flowering of judicial will and as a destructive salvo in the attack upon 
the essential distinction between legislation and adjudication (p. 144). 
Although its framers intended the fourteenth amendment due pro-
cess clause to require fidelity to both the "settled issues and modes of 
proceeding" in the common law 10 and to constitutional provisions, 
Wolfe contends that they most certainly did not envision the use of 
due process as a device for subordinating the legislatures to laissez-
faire natural-justice principles (p. 145). In the Lochner era, with due 
process invoked to strike down all government acts that "arbitrarily 
depriv[ed] people of life, liberty or property," the Court defined "arbi-
trary" on a case-by-case basis (p. 153). This, for Wolfe, was a blatant 
invasion by judicial will, amounting to a system in which judicial de-
termination set the general rules regulating.the community. More-
over, Wolfe postulates, this growth in the legislative bench was 
disguised (as it still is today) in the language of traditional judicial 
review (p. 154). 
The final part of Wolfe's book attempts to bring the history into 
perspective by analyzing the contemporary Court and current consti-
tutional jurisprudence. He maintains that the departure from tradi-
tional conceptions of judicial review became most complete during the 
modem era (after 1937). During this third phase, the focus shifted 
away from economic laissez-faire toward notions of equality and indi-
vidual rights. 
The 1937 break with economic substantive due process is fre-
quently considered a defeat of the Court at the hands of the political 
branches. Wolfe, however, sees the "switch in time" as a victory for 
modem judicial power. The saved Nine subsequently abandoned any 
attempt to articulate an " 'intelligible standard,' one of kind rather 
than degree," for distinguishing federally regulable economic activities 
from those reserved to the states (p. 180). The premises behind the 
Lochner era rise of Court power remained intact; the focus merely 
shifted from economic regulation to social spheres such as privacy and 
civil rights. 
Wolfe quotes Woodrow Wilson for the modem proposition that 
the Constitution, an elastic and adaptable document, needs to be al-
tered to meet contemporary exigencies.11 In this view, the Constitu-
tion is no longer seen as a conclusive arbiter of decisions, but instead 
as a collection of presumptions in favor of certain policies - presump-
tions to be balanced against other contemporary values (p. 229). This 
10. P. 137 (quoting Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 
272, 277 (1856)). 
11. Pp. 206, 208. Wilson's views on the proper role of the document changed between his 
earlier and later works, although the implications for expansive judicial review did not. See W. 
WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT (1885); W. WILSON, CoNSTITUTIONAL GOVERN-
MENT IN THE UNITED STATES (1921); see also Wolfe, Woodrow Wilson: Interpreting the Consti-
tution, 41 REV. OF POL. 121 (1979). 
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"balancing," very much a feature of the modern era, signifies the re-
placement of the traditional qualitative analysis of kinds of power with 
a quantitative inquiry into the degree of importance attached to exer-
cises of power. 
Wolfe argues that with this departure from qualitative analysis of 
concrete provisions, the distinction between constitutional interpreta-
tion and common law has broken down. 12 Wolfe submits that consti-
tutional law ought not to be judge-made law. Instead, it should be the 
result of judicial review applied solely to statutes that are clearly con-
tradictory to the propositions of government envisioned by the found-
ers. In this sense, the current state of affairs reflects "a significant shift 
away from the thought of the American founding" (p. 233). Wolfe 
finds that the modern Court's "legislating" under extraconstitutional 
or extended "rights," such as privacy and equality, forsakes fidelity to 
the original intent of the Constitution in favor of "public policy mak-
ing" (p. 297). Case by case, the Court develops new balancing tests, 
then later alters them incrementally in reaction to shifts in Justices' 
policy preferences. 
It is in his analysis of the modern Court that Wolfe's own values 
first become destructive to his anti-judicial activism thesis. He tends 
in later chapters to be result-oriented, molding his theory to fit his own 
policy ideals. In his consideration of decisions made during the earlier 
periods, Wolfe maintains a relatively detached perspective, scrutiniz-
ing process rather than outcome. However, in his examination of re-
cent decisions, evidence of his political bias becomes so apparent that 
it casts doubt upon his underlying motivation. For example, Wolfe 
permits his anti-abortion bias to color his treatment of Roe v. Wade, 13 
"the most raw exercise of judicial power since Dred Scott. . . . The 
Court imposed its own approbation of abortion on the nation at large" 
(p. 307). Although Wolfe's observations on the extent to which Roe 
represents unrestrained judicial review supports his thesis, the damna-
tory quality of his disagreement on the merits overshadows whatever 
theoretical merit these observations might have.14 
12. Justice Cardozo's views support this changed view entirely. See B. CARDOZO, Lecture 
/IL The Method of Sociology. The Judge as a Legislator, in THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL 
PROCESS 98 (1921). He does, however, warn against permitting a jurisprudence to exist without 
being "constantly brought into relation to objective or external standards" lest it degenerate into 
" 'Die Gefiih/sjurisprudenz,' a jurisprudence of mere sentiment or feeling." Id. at 106. 
13. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
14. Most disappointing on this score is a footnote critical of Jesse Choper's blessing of the 
abortion decision: "Law school professors are typical of intelligent elites who strongly support 
abortion. Perhaps this is so because it takes considerable intellectual skill to 'show' that a fetus 
conceived by a man and woman is not a separate 'human' being, but only 'part of a woman's 
body.'" P. 342 n.21 (criticizing J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE NATIONAL POLITICAL 
PROCESS: A FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT (1980)), 
Wolfe impeaches Choper by charging that Choper assumes that "generally liberal decisions are 
good and conservative ones are bad.'' P. 342. Here Wolfe makes the identical error, merely 
reversing the political stance. 
April-May 1987) The Federal Courts and the Constitution 1197 
In his conclusion, Wolfe, in an interesting aside, considers the the-
ories of Ronald Dworkin, John Hart Ely, and Jesse Choper. Wolfe 
critiques both Dworkin's expansive role for the constitutional judgets 
and Ely's elusive middle ground between "narrow clause-based inter-
pretivism" and unrestrained judicial review. 16 Wolfe finds each theory 
too permissive; their presentation serves to strengthen the reader's un-
derstanding of Wolfe's own commitment to the most restrained 
position. 
Wolfe's book is useful primarily as a history of the changing notion 
of judicial review and the extent to which the process has been one of 
accretion, with the emergence of the legislative judiciary occurring 
largely under a cloak of fidelity to Marshall's original perception of the 
Court as constitutional watchdog. Wolfe's advocacy of a return to a 
more limited role for the judiciary is weakened only when the ap-
proach becomes result-oriented in the later chapters. But his thesis is 
well-pondered and well-documented, and it achieves its goal ofleaving 
the reader wondering whether the contemporary Court ought to "leg-
islate" its way into provinces where John Marshall never would have 
dared to lead it. 
- Ward A. Greenberg 
15. See R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 132-33 (1977). Dworkin's "liberal the-
ory of law" defends the constitutional philosophy of the Warren Court using what is closer to a 
vague generalities interpretation of constitutional provisions. 
16. See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980). 
